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W
hen I speak of a Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) for Latin America, I 
mean a mechanism that monitors and makes bank activities public. Thanks 
to CRA, we know where banks lend, to whom they lend (by income, race-
ethnicity,  and  gender),  and  to  what  degree  these  customers  reflect  the 
profiles of the banks’ depositors. We can detect discriminatory policies toward the poor in 
both lending and deposits. The CRA has also created incentives for banks and other financial 
institutions to increase their presence in and their services to low-income neighborhoods. 
CRA was conceived in the 1970s mainly to identify and to combat "redlining" in U.S. 
communities. Redlining was a common banking practice of labeling certain neighborhoods 
undesirable  (mainly  black  and  low-income  areas).  By  withholding  their  services,  banks 
accelerated the physical and economic deterioration in these stigmatized communities, the 
“urban ghettos,” as they were known at the time. This disinvestment contributed to "urban 
blight" and white flight to the suburbs, which in turn led to more urban blight and more 
urban ghettos. CRA offered a tool to quantify and characterize financial services in poor 
communities, and to push banks to offer coverage to all, regardless of race, income, or 
geographic location. 
To the degree that CRA has resulted in greater investments in low-income communities 
in the United States, it has counted on a tradition of community activism and local govern-
ment, reinforced by a decentralized housing policy that came into being after CRA. David 
Erickson, in his recent book The Housing Policy Revolution, describes this "policy revolu-
tion" in support of local community efforts and argues that its impact extends beyond the 
CRA itself to a range of programs that it set in motion, such as the Financial Industry Regu-
latory Authority (FINRA) and others. The same argument can be applied to Latin America. 
Why a CRA Is Needed in Latin America
A drive across any of Latin America's cities reveals why. The drive begins in elegant 
neighborhoods with stately homes and gracious apartment buildings, well-lit parks, broad 
sidewalks and paved roadways. These are the neighborhoods that are home to the wealthiest 
10 percent of the population and occupy about 25 percent of the urban map.
The drive continues through the "middle class" neighborhoods where another 40 percent 
live. Here the street scene varies. Some neighborhoods have streetlights, sidewalks, and parks. 
In others, street paving may be uneven and storm water drainage may not exist, leaving 
puddles and garbage piled at the curbs (if there are sidewalks) and at corners. But in general, 
the middle class enjoys all the basic services: running water and sewers, roads, transportation, 
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housing itself tends to be standardized: modest but comfortable units and low-rise apartment 
buildings repeated along planned cul-de-sacs. The housing is generally built by professional 
developers and financed by local banks. The wealthy and middle class make up “the better 
half,” or the "formal" sector. 
Moving now into the rest of the city, where the poorer half resides, things change. The 
view is urban blight on a grand scale. Houses range from tin-roofed shanties to unpainted 
block constructions with exposed re-bars. There are few, if any, shopping centers or public 
buildings, and very few “finished homes.” No-man’s land for developers and banks, these 
neighborhoods are referred to in the urban issues literature as examples of “progressive devel-
opment,” whereby the transformation from squatter shanty to completed and fully-serviced 
home evolves block by block and may take more than three generations to be finished in 
the US sense. Banks do not make loans to the typical low-income self-help builder in Latin 
America. Instead, the owner-builder (or the “maestro”) buys materials as he or she can afford 
them, which explains the piles of cement blocks that often rise up in the yards of the low-
income households. Of course the price of cement block increases when purchased in small 
numbers, so the owner-builder pays a premium. The owner-builder pays a second premium, 
ranging from 10 percent to 20 percent per month, for materials bought on credit. With time, 
progressive development can lead to respectable housing, but costs for the owner-builder 
can be ten times the cost for a mortgage on the same house, and neighborhood features 
remain few and network services scattered. Although running water reaches about half of 
the low-income neighborhoods, where there are connections, the actual hours of operation 
are far from regular. The large plastic barrels in front of homes are a dead give-away that 
residents rely on cistern trucks for at least some of their water supply. And if they have no 
water connections, it is a sure bet they also have no sanitary sewer connections and may not 
have electricity either. 
A full quarter of Latin America's urban population is estimated to have no running water. 
Only half of urban families are believed to have domestic sewer connections. The lack of 
services is not owing to poverty. Ironically, the 25 percent of Latin American families that 
buy water from cistern trucks generally pay not only a far higher price than the families 
with running water, but they pay what could easily cover the installation and operation of 
full water and sanitation services. Furthermore, the low-income neighborhoods have solid 
records of repayment. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have financed community 
services on micro-credit terms, emphasizing quick repayment (fewer than two years) and high 
interest rates (25 to 40 percent annually). Even with the high interest, monthly payments are 
still less than current service payments. Clearly, both communities and banks could benefit if 
financing were available but banks do not offer financing for neighborhood improvements. 
They of course finance service connections and infrastructure costs as part of a mortgage 
loan, backed by a house. But traditionally banks require some form of collateral for loans 
and no one has figured out how to use infrastructure to guarantee a bank loan because no 
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developed by NGOs, are issued on a “personal guarantee,” and apply high interest rates and 
short repayment periods to cover their risks. 
In any case, we will never know the reasons how lending practices are related to the 
low community service and housing standards in Latin America without tracking the avail-
ability of loans and financing. A significant reason why CRA is needed in Latin America is 
thus to quantify the investments in infrastructure services and their distribution and to raise 
awareness across the board. Data are crucial to identifying and tracking the problem, and 
to resolving a key question: Does the lack of services in certain communities result from 
underinvesting?
Macroeconomic studies by the World Bank show a dramatic decline in overall investment 
in infrastructure in Latin America over the past two decades. In particular, private investment 
in infrastructure lags well behind other developed countries. Country-specific data show a 
similar pattern of distorted investments. An analysis of housing in Guatemala shows that in 
2004, 80 percent of the total housing investment (public and private) went to families in the 
upper 15 percent of the income bracket. Another 16 percent of investment went to the one-
fourth of families whose incomes place them in 50-75 percent income bracket. The lowest 
earners (60 percent of Guatemalan families) shared the remaining 4 percent. The investment 
patterns may not be the result of deliberate redlining, but the results are the same. Invest-
ments in the poorer half of Latin America's urban communities are seriously lagging. 
Stimulating Private-Sector Lending and Investment
A CRA in Latin America could stimulate private-sector lending and investment in low-
income communities. CRA may not be the banks’ favorite regulation given that it rates them 
on their performance with low-income groups. But it has generated more business for the 
financial sector. Not only does the CRA offer a glimpse of what the competition is doing 
(or ignoring) in lower-income neighborhoods, but it also provides communities with basic 
information on how funds are being distributed, and what services cost. This stimulates a 
dialogue between lower-income groups and commercial banks, a dialogue that has produced 
legislation and tools for the community-based financial sector (for example, for Community 
Development Financial Institutions [CDFIs] and local development grants programs).
Our experience in Central America, Mexico, and Colombia proved that banks were 
extremely interested in data on their own industry and its coverage of low-income groups—
the bottom 60 percent. Informally, bank managers admit that the industry has become 
stymied by its limited clientele. As one former president of a Mexican bank confided, 
The top 10 percent command a lot of money, a higher proportion of GDP, 
than the bottom 50 percent, but there’s only so much they want to spend 
on financial services. And now that all but one Mexican bank are owned by 
non-Mexicans, they see the way to build the bottom line as cutting costs 
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markets, but a fellow who comes over from Spain or Italy to manage a bank 
for two years just doesn’t have the time to learn about the reality of Mexico.
During  my  work  in  Guatemala,  I  saw  a  good  example  of  how  information-sharing 
can stimulate bank action. In 2002, Jose Luis Gandara, the Guatemalan Vice Minister of 
Housing, brought a group of stakeholders to Washington, DC, to visit the World Bank and 
to attend the National Community Reinvestment Coalition (NCRC) conference. The group 
included the director of community micro-credits from a large Guatemalan NGO, Genesis 
Empressarial, and the president of the Guatemalan Bankers’ Association, who is also presi-
dent of one of the largest banks in Guatemala, the G&T Continental. The presentation by 
the director of micro-credits on loans for community improvement caught the attention of 
the president of the G&T Continental. Shortly thereafter, the bank opened its own micro-
credit department, staffed by the former directors of Genesis Empressarial. 
In Colombia, the dialogue took a different turn. As they shared their data on service 
distribution for the first time ever, the banks declared their interest in serving poor commu-
nities but explained to the community representatives that the risks of robbery and violence 
kept them away. Together with the bank regulators they hammered out an agreement by 
which banks could open branches inside police stations in low-income communities and 
rural towns. As we discussed the great interest the banks were showing in the new data, 
Colombia’s then Minister of Finance confided to me, “They remind me of kids at a swim-
ming pool. They all want to get into this new market. But no one wants to be the first one 
in. They’d rather someone else jump first. Let him find out how deep it is and where the 
rocks are.” Maybe, I suggested, they needed the government to act like a life guard and blow 
a whistle for them all to jump.
In Guatemala, the data gathering and sharing led to the creation of a national stakeholders’ 
council on housing and to an ongoing dialogue about how to increase investments in home 
improvement and community upgrading through private-sector participation. The group is 
currently focused on creating a facility to sell insurance to banks for loans to low-income 
communities for home improvement and community upgrading. Guatemala’s program is 
the first to address the issue of group lending through micro-credit; investment in network 
service would require formation of a group to borrow and repay the investment. NGO expe-
riences in Guatemala and in the rest of Central America suggest that the risks involved in 
lending to low-income groups are low. Poor families tend to pay off debts quickly. Further-
more, even with high micro-credit interest rates, monthly payments for network service 
installation and use is well below the monthly cost for water from cistern trucks.
Stimulating More and Improved Financial Services for Low-Income Communities
In Latin America, the high percentage of “unbanked” residents (that is, those without 
bank accounts) means that up to 75 percent of the population is out of luck (and out of 
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transfers. This exclusion hurts the poor as much as discrimination in lending does. World 
Bank studies carried out with the Mexican government in 2002 and 2003 show that living on a 
“cash” cash flow in Mexico City can cost the unbanked up to 25 percent of monthly income. 
Further World Bank studies in Mexico, Colombia, and Brazil from 2002-2005 show that the 
percentage of unbanked ranging from 66 percent (Brazil) to 78 percent (Mexico), compared 
with 2 percent in Spain and Germany and 8 percent in the United States. The same studies 
show that the majority of the unbanked want savings and payment services more than loans. 
A CRA for Latin America would have to track bank depositors as well as borrowers.
To add further evidence that Latin America could benefit from a CRA, consider the 
impact of the lack of investments in social, economic, and environmental development 
when 60 percent of the population is involved. While it would take a bit of analysis, it does 
not take much imagination to see how the situation of Latin America's urban poor could be 
vastly improved with access to credit and banking services. The slums of Latin America pose 
health hazards and raise morbidity rates for the entire community. This, in turn, reduces 
national capacity for productivity, and when 60 percent of the population lives on a cash 
economy, it makes for a very inefficient financial system. All told, the financial exclusion 
of half the urban population creates a serious counterweight to regional economic develop-
ment. Latin America's need to bring its marginalized populations into the mainstream is no 
less urgent than that of the United States in the 1970s. 
Why a CRA Won’t Work in Latin America
Although I would energetically advocate for a CRA in Latin America, I recognize that it 
will take much more than a simple passage of legislation to rectify the inequities and stimu-
late increased investments in poor communities. So let's look at why a CRA won't work in 
Latin America.
For starters, Latin America's political system, like Europe's, is not based on geographic 
representation.  Neighborhoods  cannot  point  to  their  particular  congressperson  because 
political parties vote for representatives. While this helps eliminates "pork" in legislation and 
guarantees representation of a broader range of political interests, it also makes it harder for 
local issues to get a national hearing. At the local level, the fact that "unserviced" communi-
ties are not counted as part of the urban map means they cannot register for municipal elec-
tions. Only the neighborhoods that already have network services are considered “urban.” 
The others are by definition rural. The neighborhoods that stretch alongside rivers and in 
gullies in Latin America’s major cities do not belong to the city and are not the responsibility 
of the mayor or city council. If a person lacks a water connection, then they also lack an 
urban address, and with that, the right to vote in a municipal election. 
Another reason CRA will not happen soon in Latin America is the possibility that the 
existing situation suits the municipalities politically. When low-income families cannot buy 
access to network services, the government, in this case the municipality, becomes the only 
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and energy—and who will not. This translates into gratitude, loyalty, votes from the lucky 
families who are connected, and in turn political clout. If the “informal belts” surrounding 
Latin American cities could buy their own water and sanitation, they would vote for mayor 
and city council representatives. While this might be considered a good thing in the long 
run, it has not occurred to any local or national governments, perhaps because the present 
situation better serves their purposes. 
This makes for a final ironic reason why a CRA would not work in Latin America. 
Because the state provides the services, the service is cheap. Traditionally the public sector 
runs deficits for its public works. A commercial bank could not finance such works and not 
get paid back. In many Latin American countries, network hooks-ups and service charges are 
subsidized by the government on the basis of income, which makes it difficult for private 
builders and banks to compete. Studies of private network provision routinely conclude that 
nongovernment networks cost less than government services, although comparison is always 
complicated by lack of transparency and subsidies in the public sector. Nonetheless, the 
popular view is that if the government provides a service, it comes free, although it may take 
time and will certainly be less than perfect when it arrives than a network which is privately 
financed and built. Still, some communities are ready to pay the extra cost. The director of 
micro-lending at Genesis Empresarial told the story of a low-income community that applied 
for funds to install an electrical network to enable the community to purchase power from 
the national energy company. Why, she asked the community leaders, would you want to 
borrow at micro-finance rates when the government will install the network for free? The 
answer: “We know we could get the electrical services for free if we wait for the government, 
but we’d rather pay to have the services now, not in five, ten, or twenty years.” 
A community development organization might enjoy fighting these limits and finding 
financing for community investments. But a tradition of grassroots and community organi-
zation does not exist in Latin America, despite the large number of internationally backed 
NGOs. If the unserviced communities could manage to form a political union, like an NCRC, 
they could represent a powerful political block in each country. A CRA could provide the 
information necessary to argue for and to create incentives for banks and local governments 
to support investments in low-income communities. But politics of interest is not part of 
the Latin American tradition. I can recall only one political movement purporting to speak 
for the low-income communities: "El Super Barrio" from Mexico City in the 1980s. Super 
Barrio was a political force that managed to end the long-standing monopoly of the Partido 
Revoluconario Institucional (PRI) in Mexico City's politics, ushering the Partido Revolucio-
nario Democratico (PRD) into the mayor's office. But Super Barrio has since disappeared 
from the map. To match CRA's achievements, Latin America needs to develop strong local 
voices or to develop its own variety of support institutions. So here’s a last reason CRA isn’t 
happening in Latin America: If the municipalities won’t do it, and if the communities can’t 
do it, would the banks propose a CRA for Latin America? It is hard to imagine banks looking 
for more regulatory requirements. 
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and discloses who benefits from banking services and who does not, and that prods the 
private sector to correct existing discrimination. But as long as Latin America's communities 
have no voice or political power, and while local governments are comfortable with the situ-
ation and banks will not argue for their own regulation, Latin America will be unable to take 
advantage of what a CRA has to offer.
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